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Abstract 
The question for the tax authority is how individuals become aware of enforcement 
effort. To be an effective tool in reducing tax evasion taxpayers must be aware of the 
current audit and penalty regime. We use laboratory experiments to examine the 
compliance impact of types of information dissemination regarding audit frequency and 
results. The information includes “official” information disseminated by the tax authority, 
and “unofficial”, or informal, communications among taxpayers. Our results indicate that 
the effect of the type of post-audit information is conditional on whether the taxpayer is 
well informed of the audit rate prior to filing. We find that the tax authority would be 
served by pre-announcing audit rates credibly and by emphasizing the previous period 
audit frequency in annual reporting of enforcement effort. 
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1. Introduction 
Taxpayer audits are a central feature of the voluntary compliance mechanism in the 
personal income tax system of many countries, largely because more frequent audits 
are thought to reduce tax evasion. Audits are thought to have a direct deterrent effect 
on those individuals actually audited; perhaps of more importance, audits are also 
thought to have an indirect deterrent effect on individuals not actually audited. However, 
the magnitude of these deterrent effects depends critically on the taxpayer being 
informed of enforcement efforts. As Plumley (1996) notes, “[i]t is generally believed … 
that many taxpayers would perceive increased auditing by the IRS [Internal Revenue 
Service] as an increase in their chances of being audited, and that they would improve 
their voluntary compliance as a result”. Yet, theways by which taxpayers become 
informed about audit intensity and then respond to their assessments of enforcement 
efforts are “open questions” (Plumley, 1996). A valid assessment of the effectiveness of 
audits must incorporate taxpayers' awareness of the likelihood of audit. 
 
Informational effects can arise through official announcements of audit occurrences and 
results, media reports, and taxpayer-to-taxpayer communication. The responses of 
taxpayers to levels of enforcement are difficult to measure and so are not known 
precisely. In effect, one must construct a natural or controlled experiment to obtain an 
estimate of taxpayer awareness of enforcement. Dubin et al. (1990), utilize naturally 
occurring field data by employing U.S. state-level reporting data for the years 1977 to 
1986 to estimate the effects of differences in audit rates on reported income. Their 
estimates indicated that the decline in audit rates over this decade led to a significant 
decline in income tax collections, which would imply that the taxpayers somehow 
became aware of the lower risk associated with evasion. More recent work by Dubin 
(2007) gives a similar result. As with all studies based on field data, these studies suffer 
from not having direct measures of noncompliance (thus the use of reported income, 
not unreported income), from being forced to contend with various econometric issues 
(e.g., the endogeneity of audit selection arising from budget constraints facing tax 
authorities), and from the inability to control for all variables that might affect taxpayer 
reporting decisions (e.g., changes in the tax laws, taxpayer attitudes, economic 
conditions).  
 
In a novel effort to test more directly the deterrent effects of making taxpayers aware of 
audits, Slemrod et al. (2001) worked with the State of Minnesota to conduct a controlled 
field experiment. They selected a stratified random sample of roughly 2000 Minnesota 
taxpayers, and these taxpayers were sent a letter by the Minnesota Department of 
Revenue in January 1994 that the tax returns they were about to file would be “closely 
examined”. The intent of the experiment was to see whether informing individuals about 
an increase in the probability of audit prior to filing a tax return would in fact increase 
their compliance. Slemrod et al. (2001) found that low- and middle-income taxpayers 
responded as predicted, by increasing their reported levels of income; however, they 
also found the surprising and unexpected result that high-income taxpayers reduced 
their reported income, even with the threat that their return would be “closely examined”, 
a threat clearly intended to convey higher probability of audit. 
However, their work did not have information on compliance but rather used reported 
income, an indirect measure of compliance because the taxpayers receiving the letters 
were not actually audited. Further, since there was only one information treatment in 
their field experiment, they were not able to compare compliance behavior across 
information programs nor were they able to ascertain any effects on compliance of 
taxpayer-to-taxpayer communication. The ways in which recipients of the “closely 
examined” letter interpreted this phrase are also uncertain. 
 
Consequently, despite the many important insights from empirical studies using 
naturally occurring or experimental-based field data, there remains no systematic 
evidence on the impact on compliance of the ways in which audit information is 
disseminated to taxpayers or communicated by taxpayers. Tax agencies, such as the 
IRS, are largely ignorant of this most important aspect of increasing enforcement efforts. 
The typical economics-of-crime approach to tax evasion suggests that compliance can 
be increased through more enforcement, yet the key policy issue is how information 
regarding enforcement efforts is disseminated and subsequently affects compliance, 
and this issue remains unresolved. 
 
We utilize a laboratory market setting to investigate the effects of information 
concerning enforcement and compliance behavior of others on the tax reporting 
behavior of individual taxpayers. While an understanding of how taxpayers form beliefs 
regarding enforcement efforts would be of interest in its own right, our focus here is on 
the interaction between information dissemination and compliance behavior. In our 
laboratory setting we are able to manipulate, as treatments, the information presented 
to the taxpayers and to offer taxpayers opportunities to communicate within their cohort 
the results of prior audits and past compliance. In the base case sessions, the 
participants receive no further information about audit results beyond their own audit 
experience. In a second treatment the same objective audit rates are in effect, and 
participants have additional information as they are told by the experimenter the actual 
number of audits conducted (and sometimes the fines collected) during a period. In a 
third treatment the participants are offered the opportunity to send a “message” to the 
other participants about their audit experience; subjects may also choose to send no 
message, and participants may send a message that is truthful or not. The experimental 
design therefore allows us to test hypotheses about the awareness of audit probabilities 
arising from two types of information dissemination regarding audit policies and results: 
“official” information disseminated by the “tax authority” (experiment software), and 
informal or “unofficial” communications among “taxpayers” (subjects). Further, the 
design allows us to estimate the direct and indirect effects of audits in ways that 
overcome some of the econometric issues arising with field data. 
 
Since our design implements two extreme regimes of pre-filing information regarding 
audit probabilities we analyze the data for these regimes separately. Individual 
characteristics affect compliance rates about the same in each regime. However, the 
responses to official and unofficial information do vary across the regimes in ways that 
are consistent with arguments developed in the paper. Briefly, our results suggest that 
taxpayers will respond to wide ranging information sources that report the enforcement 
effort. These responses are more prominent when the taxpayers are not provided audit 
probabilities prior to making their filing decisions. Overall, our results yield an estimate 
of the indirect effect on compliance of 4.4 times the direct effect on compliance, an 
estimate that falls within the range of estimates from field data. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
The economic model of income tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) is based on 
the economics-of-crime approach pioneered by Becker (1968) and focuses on the 
income reporting behavior of taxpayers, ignoring other forms of evasion such as non-
payment, excessive reporting of deductions, and non-filing. In its simplest form, an 
individual is assumed to receive a fixed amount of income I, and must choose how 
much of this income to declare (to the tax authorities). The individual pays taxes at rate t 
on every dollar D of income that is declared, while no taxes are paid on underreported 
income. However, the individual may be audited with a fixed, predetermined probability 
p; if audited, then all underreported income is discovered, and the individual must pay a 
penalty at rate f on each dollar of taxes that he or she underreported. The individual's 
income IC if caught underreporting equals IC=I−tD−f[t(I−D)], while if underreporting is 
not caught income IN is IN=I−tD. The individual then chooses declared income to 
maximize the expected utility E U(I) of the evasion gamble, or 
 
(1)     
 
where E is the expectation operator and utility U(I) is a function only of income. This 
optimization generates a standard first-order condition for an interior solution; given 
concavity of the utility function, the second-order condition will be satisfied. Comparative 
statics results are easily derived. It is straightforward to show that an increase in the 
probability of detection p and in the penalty rate f unambiguously increases declared 
income. 
 
This standard model has been modified in a number of ways, partly in an attempt to 
generate predicted compliance rates that more closely fit actual compliance rates. 
Incorporating non-expected utility behavior (e.g., individuals exhibiting loss aversion or 
more extreme forms of risk aversion, such as rank dependent expected utility) yields 
predictions of compliance levels more consistent with observed behavior (Bernasconi, 
1998). For example, for individuals described by rank dependent expected utility the 
basic maximization problem of Eq. (1) is modified, following Quiggin (1993), to obtain: 
 
(2)     
 
where g (N1) serves to overweight the probability of the “bad” outcome (detection and 
punishment) and to underweight the “good” outcome (successful evasion). 
Overweighting leads to higher compliance levels than those predicted under the 
standard expected utility problem for the same enforcement. 
 
An alternative extension incorporates the notion of a “social norm” in compliance. 
Although difficult to define precisely, a social norm can be distinguished by the feature 
that it is process-oriented, unlike the outcome-orientation of individual rationality (Elster, 
1989). A social norm represents a pattern of behavior that is judged in a similar way by 
others and that is sustained in part by social approval or disapproval. This suggests an 
individual will comply as long as he or she believes that compliance is the social norm; if 
noncompliance becomes pervasive, then the social norm of compliance disappears. 
Official and unofficial communications can clearly affect this social norm. 
 
There are several ways in which a social norm can be introduced. Perhaps the simplest 
way is suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who incorporate what they term a 
“reference point” as a form of social norm in prospect theory. They assume that a loss in 
utility occurs if individuals do not achieve their reference point. The reference point may 
be achieved by reporting all income and paying all taxes; individuals who declare less 
than their full income and pay less than their full taxes will suffer a loss in utility. More 
formally, assume that each individual still maximizes E U(I), defined as in Eq. (1) but 
where IN is reduced by the amount γ[t(I−D)]. The individual now is assumed to suffer a 
(monetized) cognitive cost proportional to undisclosed taxes, and the coefficient γ 
measures (as a fraction of income) how much the individual would pay to avoid the loss 
associated with each dollar of unreported taxes. If the noncompliance is detected (and 
punished), then the cognitive cost is assumed to be covered by paying the penalty. 
Clearly, γ is likely to be sensitive to the social norm of tax compliance. The stronger is 
the social norm, the more deviant the behavior of a noncompliant individual becomes, 
and the more loss the individual feels. Of course, Eq. (2) can be similarly modified. 
 
In all of these analyses it is assumed that taxpayers know the actual audit probability 
and penalties when making their compliance decisions. What is unavoidably and 
necessarily missing from the empirical work of Dubin et al. (1990), Dubin (2007), and 
others is a model of the manner by which information concerning the true audit 
probability and levied fines is communicated among the taxpayers and how changes in 
enforcement result in changed levels of compliance, perhaps through changes in 
perceived audit probabilities, through changes in overweighting, or through changes in 
social norms. The IRS may announce that it will raise or lower the audit rate, and we 
know from Slemrod et al. (2001) that this announcement may affect compliance. As 
emphasized earlier by Plumley (1996), an open empirical question is how a taxpayer 
forms an assessment of the probability of audit and, in particular, then responds to 
changes in this assessment. 
 
The responses to information reporting current period audit results depend on whether 
official audit probabilities have been (credibly) pre-announced. When the audit 
probability has not been pre-announced, information reporting high audit activity will 
increase the subjective probability of an audit while information that reports low audit 
activity will lower this probability. In these (Series B) settings information reporting 
compliance/evasion behavior will be less likely to affect compliance behavior. When the 
audit probability is pre-announced (Series A), the effect of information reporting auditing 
activity will have less effect while information regarding compliance/evasion behavior 
will be more likely to affect compliance than in the Series B setting.  
 
We do not know individual taxpayer optimal compliance rates for a given enforcement 
regime since we do not elicit risk preferences. We do know that our aggregate 
compliance rate is less than one. Since the objective of the tax authority is to increase 
compliance and its policy basket includes enforcement information, our experimental 
investigations inform the agency of the direction of effects of information treatments. 
 
3. Experimental design 
The experimental design captures the essential features of the voluntary income 
reporting and tax assessment system used in many countries. Human participants in a 
controlled laboratory environment earn income through their performance in a task and 
decide how much of this income to report to a tax agency. Taxes are paid on reported 
income only. However, unreported income may be discovered via a random audit, and 
the participant must then pay the owed taxes plus a fine based on the unpaid taxes. 
This income earning, income reporting, audit, and penalty process is repeated for a 
given number of rounds each representing a tax period. At the completion of the 
experiment, all participants are paid in cash their laboratory market earnings converted 
to U.S. dollars. 
 
The policy question investigated is: how does the transmission of information about 
enforcement efforts affect compliance behavior? The experimental design specifically 
addresses this question by introducing treatments that provide different forms of 
information regarding audit probabilities and results. Our experimental design follows 
the elements of much of the earlier research (e.g., Becker et al., 1987; Alm et al., 
1992a,b), incorporating additional features to improve parallelism with taxpayers' 
decision making in the naturally occurring world.12 Participants earn income by 
performing a task (rather than receiving an endowment), disclose income, and face an 
audit process similar to that in the naturally occurring setting. The current experiments 
utilize tax language in the instructions and computer interface. The stakes are small, but 
the decision is simplified implying that the ratio of decision costs and rewards parallels 
the naturally occurring setting (Smith and Walker, 1993). 
 
Participants are recruited from the pool of undergraduate students at a major public 
university. Upon arrival at the laboratory, the participants are assigned to a computer 
station. The lab server assigns participants to groups (consisting of six to eight persons 
depending on the total number of participants in the session). The participants do not 
know who is in their group, only the number in their group, and they know that there are 
at least two groups in the session. Having multiple groups in a session increases 
anonymity for the participants. Basic instructions are provided via hardcopy while the 
main instructions are provided via a series of screen images. After the practice rounds 
are completed, any final procedural questions are answered. Participants are not 
allowed to communicate with one another during the session except when allowed via 
the computer interface as a treatment. They are not told the exact duration of the 
experimental session, which is predetermined to last for 30 real rounds. Sessions take 
on average 90 min to complete. Participant earnings range from $19 to $37, depending 
upon task earnings, reporting behavior, and audit experience. 
Participants are told that payments will be made in private at the end of the session and 
that all responses are anonymous. 
 
The earnings task requires the participants to sort the digits 1 through 9 into the correct 
ascending order from a randomized order presented in a 3 by 3 matrix. Participants do 
this by pointing the computer mouse and “clicking” on the numbers in the correct 
sequence. On their computer screen a 3 by 3 matrix with the digits in random order 
appears on the right side of the screen and as the numbers are “clicked” they appear in 
a 3 by 3 matrix on the left side of the screen. A counter on the screen shows the 
elapsed time from when the first number is “clicked” to the point when all nine have 
been ordered. The participant clicks the “Continue” button to transmit this time to the 
server. Actual income is determined by the relative speed of performance, with the 
fastest performer receiving the highest income and the slowest performer receiving the 
lowest income. Once all participants have completed the income task, they are informed 
via the computer of their income for the round and presented with a screen that 
resembles a tax form in which they may report their income. This screen informs the 
participants of the tax policy information in effect for the session. 
 
Table 1 Experimental design and aggregate results 
 
 
The experimental design consists of six treatments (Table 1). In all sessions the tax rate 
is set at 0.35 and the fine rate is set at 150%. There is no public good financed by the 
tax payments. The currency used is called “lab dollars”, and participants are told that all 
lab dollars earned during the session will be redeemed for cash at the end of the 
session at a fixed conversion rate of 90 lab dollars per 1U.S. dollar. The probability of 
audit is set at one of the levels: 0.05, 0.10, 0.30, and 0.40. Each of these probabilities is 
applied for all of the treatments shown in Table 1. In all sessions participants are 
informed of the current tax rate and the penalty rate applied to non-disclosed income. 
All audits investigate only the current period disclosure. The experiment uses a between 
subjects design; each subject participates in only one treatment (session). The 
assignment of participants to treatments is completely randomized; all participants are 
drawn from the pool of potential subjects who had signed up for lab experiments. In 
each session, the audit probability is changed once (beginning in round 16) so that each 
participant faced two of the audit probabilities used in the experiment design for further 
randomization and in approximately half of the sessions the audit probability increased. 
 
There are several ways in which “official” information regarding the audit activity of the 
tax authority could reach taxpayers and, potentially, affect compliance. The tax authority 
may or may not announce the audit probability (e.g., the fixed and predetermined audit 
rate); also, the tax authority may or may not announce the audit results (the number of 
audits actually conducted and/or the total fines actually collected from the audits). This 
“official” information is assumed to be treated as credible by the taxpayers. 
 
Accordingly, we have partitioned our sessions into two primary groups to investigate the 
impact of such official information. In the first, denoted “Series A” in Table 1, the audit 
probability is announced to all subjects prior to the tax filing decision. In the second 
(“Series B” in Table 1), the audit probability is not announced. Thus, the Series A and B 
settings can be considered to represent the extremes in the level of prior audit 
probability information. 
 
We investigate another “official” information mechanism by which reports of auditing 
results could be transmitted to the taxpayers. In the first treatment T1, in both Series A 
and B, participants are not provided with “official” information from the tax authority on 
the results of any audits actually conducted. In the second treatment T2, the actual 
number of audits conducted is reported at the end of each period; in some sessions in 
the T2 treatment the subjects are also told the aggregate fines collected via the audits. 
 
Finally, we investigate the role of what we term an “unofficial” information mechanism. 
For this mechanism, denoted T3 (in both Series A and B), the participants are permitted 
to send one message (via the computer) each round to all persons in their group. The 
possible messages are reported in Table 2. This unofficial communication process 
works as follows. Before the next round begins, the participants receive a table of 
information on their computer screen that reports all the messages sent by the others in 
their group. The information is presented in a table presented to the subjects that shows 
the frequency of each message. Since the actual number of audits is not reported in this 
setting, there is no means by which the subjects can verify whether this information is 
truthful15, and indeed the experimental setting does not impose the requirement that 
the information be truthful. 
 
Table 2 Allowed messages in Treatment 3 
 
 
At the end of the session, the participants complete a short questionnaire by reporting 
their age, gender, and whether they prepare and file their own taxes. 
The process of determining who is audited is generated by a computerized draw. In 
sessions in which the audit probability is announced, the participants are presented with 
an animated (computerized) representation of a bucket from which a draw is made. In 
this bucket there are 20 blue and white balls, with a white ball signifying no audit and a 
blue ball denoting an audit. Each taxpayer is audited independently. The balls “bounce” 
in this bucket and, after a random interval, a door opens and a ball exits the bucket 
through this door (blue for audit, white for no audit). When the audit probabilities are not 
announced, the bucket does not appear on the screen; the taxpayer simply receives a 
text message that reports whether he or she was audited or not. In these sessions, after 
the taxpayer reports income, there is a delay while the server performs a random 
process that is identical to that used by the virtual bingo cage and announces the audit 
result. 
 
After the audit process is completed, the taxpayers are presented a new screen that 
provides the earnings and audit outcome summary for the round. Where taxpayer-to-
taxpayer communication is allowed (T3A and T3B), participants then choose to send 
one of the messages reported in Table 2. After all taxpayers have sent a message, they 
receive further feedback in the form of a table that reports the number of persons 
sending each of the messages. In the treatment for which audit result information is 
provided by the tax authority (T2A and T2B), the taxpayers are provided a screen that 
reports the results of the audits for the individual's group. Thus, the groups in a given 
session will observe different end of round information concerning the audits conducted 
in their group. When provided, “official” information reports the number of audits 
conducted in the current round and, in a few sessions, the fines collected in the current 
round. 
 
To summarize, in Series A sessions subjects are told the official audit probability, while 
in Series B they are not given this information. In T1 the subjects learn only their own 
audit experience, in T2 the subjects learn the official count of the number of persons in 
their group that are audited (and in some cases the aggregate fines), and in T3 the 
participants receive messages from others in their group that report audit results and 
compliance behavior of the persons in their group. Treatment T1B therefore represents 
the baseline setting of minimum official information, in which neither the audit probability 
nor the audit results are announced, so that subjects know only about their own audit 
experience. Treatment T2A represents the setting with maximum official information: 
both the audit probability and the audit results are announced. T1B also represents the 
treatment with minimum official and minimum unofficial information because the audit 
probability is not announced, the audit results are not announced, and subjects are not 
allowed to send messages. Treatments T2B and T1A are intermediate cases of official 
information; in T2B the audit results but not the audit probability are announced, while in 
T1A the audit probability but not the audit results are announced. Treatments T3A and 
T3B allow unofficial communication, with (T3A) and without (T3B) official audit 
probability information. 
 
Our design constructs “groups” of individuals, by design, for the purposes of 
communicating the results from the audit process. These groups mimic naturally 
occurring cohorts in the sense that they have common interests by the design of the 
experiment (similar to the approach of Alm and McKee, 2004). The information 
communicated to the others may provide benefits in the same way that such 
communication would benefit associates in the naturally occurring setting. The total 
number of participants is 326 and the number of participants for each treatment is 
shown in Table 1. 
 
4. Compliance hypotheses 
The experimental design yields data allowing investigation of attributes of information 
that contribute to increased or reduced compliance. As in the naturally occurring world, 
individuals can obtain varying levels of information regarding the objective probability of 
an audit. The tax authority (experimenter) can announce the audit probability for the 
period, there may be less precise information based on prior periods, there may be 
discussion among taxpayers, or there may only be an individual's own audit experience. 
 
As discussed in Section 2, the impact of official information on compliance depends in 
part on the underlying model of decision making under uncertainty of the taxpayer. 
Individuals with extreme forms of risk aversion, including those with rank dependent 
expected utility preferences, will focus on reports of the “bad” outcome (e.g., being 
audited), and official information reporting audit occurrences will lead to increases in 
subjective audit risk. Such individuals will react by increasing compliance whether the 
true audit probability has been announced or not. This reasoning yields: 
 
H1. Official announcements of audit results (the number of individuals audited and/or 
the fines collected) in the previous period will, ceteris paribus, increase compliance. 
 
If the data reject this hypothesis either it is the case that the individuals do not focus on 
the audits themselves or that the audit results are consistent with a lower probability 
than individual priors. 
 
Taxpayers can engage in communication with friends and acquaintances concerning 
their experiences at the hands of the tax auditors, and such “unofficial” information will 
affect future compliance decisions. Here the issue is whether taxpayer communication 
concerning audit selection and audit outcomes leads to higher or lower compliance. If 
we continue to assume that individuals possess utility functions that overweight bad 
outcomes, communication reporting audits and audit results will work in the same 
direction as the official release of information. On the other hand, messages that 
suggest audits arise only rarely or are unable to detect evasion will reduce the 
perception that successful audits occur. Taken together these effects lead us to: 
 
H2. Reports of low audit frequency in the previous period will lead to reduced 
compliance. Reports of high audit frequency will increase compliance, and this effect 
will increase as the number of audits increases. 
 
An important additional aspect of our experimental design is that we are able to 
investigate some aspects of the effects of social norms on tax compliance. To the extent 
that paying taxes is viewed as a social contract, communications that others are 
complying will lead to higher compliance; conversely, communication that others cheat 
will lower compliance. Put differently, information (both official and unofficial) regarding 
taxpayer behavior will influence — either increasing or decreasing — the social norm of 
compliance: 
 
H3. Reports that others are compliant with the tax rules will lead to higher compliance 
on the part of individuals receiving this information. Similarly, reports that others do not 
comply will lead to lower compliance. 
 
The range of possible unofficial messages in Table 2 is quite large, but these messages 
may be usefully grouped for analysis. For example, there are two messages (5 and 7) 
that the individual complies with the tax law, while two messages (4 and 6) report 
evasion. Three messages report that one was audited (3, 5, and 7), and three report 
that one was not audited (2, 4, and 5). These classifications allow us to investigate the 
relative effects of taxpayer communication that may have either a positive or a negative 
effect on compliance. 
 
The effect of past own audits on individual compliance behavior will vary by whether the 
audit probability is known prior to filing. The taxpayer may use the audit experience to 
update his or her probability of being audited in the future, and such updating can lead 
to lower or higher future compliance. If the individual feels he or she had 
underestimated (overestimated) the probability of an audit, then (assuming a Bayesian 
updating process) the response to a past audit will be to increase the estimated 
probability and thereby to increase (decrease) compliance in the future. Our design 
allows us to examine the effects of past audits on compliance. 
 
5. Experimental results 
Raw results are reported in Table 1, where Compliance Rate is defined as the tax 
reported divided by the tax owed, and Audit Yield reports the average penalty plus tax 
owed collected via audits in the given treatment; in each case these variables are 
calculated as a simple average across all subjects and rounds. Based on casual 
inspection, it appears that providing any end of period audit information increases 
compliance in the absence of a pre-announced audit probability. The compliance rate is 
higher in T2B and T3B than T1B. When the audit probability is pre-announced, the 
official announcement of audits lowers subsequent compliance, while taxpayer-to-
taxpayer communication does not change compliance behavior. However, a more 
complete understanding of the effects of the treatment variables requires econometric 
investigation of the data, which permits examination of interaction effects, learning, and 
differential impacts of information on compliance. There are two pre-filing information 
regimes in the experiment design (as seen in Table 1). In the one case (Series A) the 
taxpayers are informed of the exact audit probability prior to the filing decision, while in 
the other case (Series B) the taxpayers   
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Summary statistics 
 
 
have no information concerning the current audit probability.20 The compliance effect of 
information from the previous period regarding audits will depend on the prior 
information regarding audit probability. Given the polar initial conditions, we have 
elected to examine the data for each separately as this allows us to focus on the 
information transmission from the cleaner starting point — no announcement of audit 
rates versus an explicit announcement. As expected, the response to post-audit 
information differs across audit rate announcement regimes and we are able to identify 
this in our data. 
 
The experimental data constitute a panel as each subject makes one decision in a 
round (income to declare). The variables that are expected to affect this decision are the 
experimental treatments (e.g., the official information provided and the unofficial 
taxpayer-to-taxpayer communication), the results from previous rounds, the audit 
probability and certain subject characteristics. While we collect some subject 
characteristic data, and find that these systematically affect estimated compliance 
behavior, we acknowledge that we may be missing some unobservable effects. We 
employ a generalized least squares panel random effects estimator (see Wooldridge, 
2002; Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). 
 
Theory suggests that the dependent variable, the individual Compliance Rate in each 
round, depends upon the individual's actual (or “true”) earned Income in the round, 
Wealth (or accumulated earnings of the individual), the probability of audit (Audit 
Probability), individual characteristics, and variables representing the information and 
communication treatments. The information and communication variables are 
constructed from the experimental design as discussed below. Individual characteristics 
include a dummy variable for whether the individual has experience with preparing his 
or her own tax return (Prepared Own Tax Return), a dummy variable for gender (Male) 
to control for any systematic effects across subjects due to gender, and a variable (Age) 
to control for subject age. 
 
The information and communication variables are of several types. “Official” information 
includes the announcement of audit results (Official Audit Results Announced), which 
may report the number of persons audited in the current period, the total or  
 
Table 4 Estimation results for dependent variable Compliance Rate 
 
 
average fines, or some combination of these. The cleanest signal is the total number 
audited (Official Number of Audits) in the round since this only depends on enforcement 
effort while the fines collected information also contains some information about overall 
compliance behavior. This variable enters the model with a one period lag. The 
individual knows whether he or she was audited in all settings, and the individual lagged 
audit result (Lag Audited) is included. “Unofficial” communication among the subjects 
includes the possibility of sending any type of message (Unofficial Message Allowed), 
as well as the four different combinations of these messages (plus the possibility of 
sending no message at all, or Unofficial Message — Do Not Send Message). Definitions 
and summary statistics are reported in Table 3.22 In each audit regime, learning is 
captured through the use of the Round variable, and this is interacted with whether or 
not the subject receives official (Round×Official) or unofficial (Round×Unofficial) 
information regarding enforcement effort. 
 
We report the results of two basic specifications in Table 4. The complete specification 
(Model 1) includes the set of interaction effects to capture the means by which the 
information concerning audits and compliance behavior affect individual compliance 
decisions. The simpler specification (Model 2) includes only the binary treatment 
variables for comparison. Both specifications include the basic set of explanatory 
variables. 
 
As predicted, compliance is negatively correlated with income and wealth. Across all 
specifications and initial information settings, we find that compliance increases with 
subject age, is lower for males, and is negatively correlated with whether the individual 
reports preparing his or her own tax return.  
 
Compliance is positively correlated with Audit Probability when this information is 
provided (Series A) but, as expected, has no significant effect when the rate is not 
known prior to the compliance decision. Interestingly, when the audit rate is 
preannounced the effect of the audit probability on compliance declines over time (Audit 
Probability× Round) but when the rate is not pre-announced (Series B), the coefficient 
on this variable is positive (at the 0.05 level). An individual's own audit immediate 
experience (Lag Own Audit) generally has no effect on compliance. This is true when 
the past audit experience was interacted with the provision of official information (Lag 
Own Audit× Official Information Provided). Absent public announcement of the audit 
probability all information would appear to increase compliance from the baseline. For 
Series B, the coefficient on both Official Information and Unofficial Messages are 
positive (at the 0.01 level). Interestingly, the provision of Official Information lowers 
compliance in the setting where the audit probability has been pre-announced 
(significant at the 0.01 level)  
 
The effect of official information reporting the number of individuals audited in the 
previous round (Lag Official Number Audited Reported) poses an interesting issue. In 
the setting in which the audit rate is pre-announced, the coefficient is positive 
(significant at 0.05 level) which suggests that this information confirms a perception that 
audits are occurring and this leads to higher compliance. However, in the setting in 
which the audit probability is not pre-announced, the coefficient is negative (significant 
at 0.01 level) and this would imply that reports of audit activity lead individuals with less 
information regarding enforcement effort to reduce their compliance. This seems 
anomalous. Official information in general increases compliance but this specific 
information appears to reduce compliance. This seems a worthy topic for some further 
research. 
 
Finally, the results for the Unofficial Information messages are particularly interesting. 
There is a clear difference across the audit rate announcement regimes. When the audit 
probability is announced the messages reporting audit outcomes are not significant but 
the messages reporting compliance behavior are significant (at the 0l01 level) and the 
signs are consistent with a social norm explanation. The more frequent the messages 
that others comply, the higher the individual compliance rate and vice versa for 
messages reporting evasion. When the audit probability is not announced, the 
messages regarding compliance behavior are at best weakly significant. However the 
messages reporting audit outcomes are highly significant and consistent with the 
subjects utilizing the information to update their probability priors. Thus, we observe that 
the coefficient for the variable reporting audits is positive (significant at the 0.01 level) 
while for reporting not being audited is negative (also significant at the 0.01 level). 
 
6. Conclusions 
How do taxpayers become informed of enforcement efforts, and how do they respond to 
this information? We use experimental methods to examine the effects on compliance 
of different means by which taxpayers may learn about and communicate audit risk and 
compliance behavior. Our data permit us to estimate the compliance effects of 
information via both official and unofficial channels. The results suggest that the effect 
of some types of information is independent of the level of prior knowledge of 
enforcement effort (audit probability) but that some types of information are more 
consistently linked to higher compliance when the audit probability is initially unknown. 
Taken as a whole, our results suggest that the tax authority should support a policy of 
pre-announcing the audit rate and then reinforcing this with reports of the frequency of 
actual audits undertaken in the previous period. If it is determined that pre-announcing 
the audit probability is not credible, then the tax authority would be served by auditing a 
sufficiently high fraction of individuals so that taxpayer-to-taxpayer communications 
report the occurrence of audits sufficiently often. However, taxpayer-to-taxpayer 
communication will generally lower compliance unless audit frequencies are much 
higher than current levels. 
 
Of further interest, our results indicate that the effect of audits is not limited to those 
actually audited. We estimate that the indirect effect of audits, calculated as the taxes 
collected from those not audited divided by the total audit yield, is 4.4; that is, total taxes 
collected are 440% greater than the revenues directly collected via the audit process 
itself. This ripple effect is comparable to estimates provided by Dubin et al. (1990) and 
Dubin (2007), all of which were generated from field data. Our experiments also provide 
some support for the effect of social norms (or social capital) in individual tax 
compliance decisions. When messages from other taxpayers report substantial levels of 
compliance among taxpayers, individuals are more likely to comply in subsequent 
rounds. Conversely, compliance declines when messages are consistent with 
widespread evasion.  
 
Although our experiments involve small numbers of persons and small stakes, they 
provide observations of behavior that are unavailable in the field. This information 
allows us to address some important behavioral questions concerning the responses of 
individuals to different types of information dissemination about audit information and 
audit results, none of which can be investigated using field data. We do not evaluate 
whether information communicated among taxpayers is or is not truthful, since 
taxpayers in our experimental setting (as in the naturally occurring world) have no 
means of determining the veracity of any communications. This important issue is left to 
future research.  
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